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INTRODUCTION 
Unlike most cases brought before the United States Supreme Court, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission1 captured 
the nation’s attention. In this case, free speech rights were pitted against 
an anti-discrimination law, and religious rights were pitted against the 
dignity of same-sex marriage. While these constitutional doctrines might 
seem nuanced and obscure to most, the central issue of the case is easy to 
grasp: Can a baker, on free speech and free exercise grounds, refuse to 
bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple?2 The Court, in a 7–2 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law 2019; B.S., University of Florida 
2016. 
 1. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).  
 2. Id. at 1723.  
1
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decision,3 ruled solely on the free exercise claim, which, at the time, came 
as a surprise to most.4  
This Comment serves a few purposes: It explains the facts of the case 
and the Justices’ arguments, summarizes the relevant constitutional 
doctrines, and provides some novel thoughts on the decision reached. 
I.  THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
In 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins planned to marry in 
Massachusetts.5 Even though their home state of Colorado did not 
recognize same-sex marriage, they intended to celebrate their marriage 
with family and friends there.6 To procure a celebratory wedding cake, 
the couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop, a Colorado bakery owned by 
Jack Phillips, a devout Christian.7 Craig, Mullins, and Phillips’s 
interaction at Masterpiece lasted mere moments.8 The couple told Phillips 
that they intended to buy a wedding cake for “our wedding,” and Phillips 
told the couple that he “does not ‘create’ wedding cakes for same-sex 
weddings.”9 Phillips based this decision on his religious beliefs.10 Neither 
party discussed design or other aesthetic characteristics of the cake.11 
Phillips offered the couple “birthday cakes, shower cakes, . . . cookies[,] 
and brownies” but would not create a wedding cake.12 The couple left the 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id. at 1722.  
 4. Id. at 1724. One commentator said that the Court “confounded all expectations.” 
Michael W. McConnell, Justices Confound Expectation in Colorado Wedding Cake Case, SLS 
(June 4, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/06/04/justices-confound-expectation-in-colorado-
wedding-cake-case/ [https://perma.cc/SFH4-8TC7]. 
For what it is worth, Jack Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, is back in court with 
another discrimination-based lawsuit. Colleen Slevin, Colorado Baker Back in Court over 2nd 
LGBT Bias Allegation, AP (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/1a242f6d02d54cc68963 
a18e9ee3ede5 [https://perma.cc/HBA7-LTPU]. 
 5. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. 
 6. Id. Three years later, the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015), constitutionalized the right to same-sex marriage. Id. at 2604 (“[T]he right to marry is a 
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived 
of that right and that liberty.”). 
 7. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas 
provided a more detailed description of Phillips’s artistic practices and religious beliefs. Id. at 
1742–43 (Thomas, J., concurring).   
 8. See Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig & David Mullins at 4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).   
 9. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. 
 10. Id. (“To Phillips, creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be equivalent 
to participating in a celebration that is contrary to his own deeply held beliefs.”).  
 11. See id.  
 12. Id.  
2
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bakery, and the following day, Craig’s mother telephoned the bakery.13 
When Craig’s mother asked why Phillips would not bake the wedding 
cake for her son, Phillips again explained his religious objections.14  
In September 2012, Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination claim 
with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission.15 The couple alleged that 
Phillips violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, which prohibits 
places of public accommodation from discriminating based on sexual 
orientation.16 Phillips argued that Colorado’s enforcement of the anti-
discrimination law violated his constitutional rights to free speech and 
free exercise of religion.17  
The case snaked its way through the state administrative agency,18 
where each decision-making body ruled against Phillips.19 Eventually, 
the case came before the full commission.20 The commission concluded 
that Phillips discriminated against Craig and Mullins based on their 
sexual orientation and ordered Phillips to comply with remedial 
measures.21  
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. Justice Gorsuch, in his concurring opinion, used the fact that Phillips denied the 
mother’s request to bake the cake to argue that Phillips—regardless of the sexual orientation of 
the customer—would not bake a cake for a same-sex wedding. Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). Therefore, according to the Justice, Phillips did not discriminate based on sexual 
orientation. Id. at 1735–36. 
 15. Id. at 1725 (majority opinion).   
 16. See id. Specifically, the act states the following:  
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to 
refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, 
race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or 
ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation 
. . . . 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2018).    
 17. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726.  
 18. The Court described how a case makes its way through the state agency. After a 
complaint is filed, the Colorado Civil Rights Division investigates the claim and determines 
whether the state anti-discrimination law was violated. Id. at 1725. If the division so decides, the 
case goes before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, where the commission determines 
whether to “initiate a formal hearing before” an administrative law judge. Id. If the commission 
so decides, the administrative law judge hears the case and issues a ruling. Id. That ruling may 
then be appealed to the commission. Id.      
 19. Id. at 1726.  
 20. Id.   
 21. Id. (“The Commission ordered Phillips to ‘cease and desist from discriminating against 
. . . same-sex couples . . . .’ It also ordered additional remedial measures, including 
‘comprehensive staff training on the Public Accommodations section’ of [the anti-discrimination 
law] ‘and changes to any and all company policies[,]’ . . . [and required] Phillips to prepare 
3
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Throughout the adjudication, many commissioners commented on 
Phillips’s religious basis for denying service to Craig and Mullins. One 
commissioner noted that Phillips needed to “compromise” his religious 
beliefs to conduct business in the state.22 Another  commented that 
religious freedom “has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination 
throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust—I 
mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations . . . . [I]t is one of the most 
despicable pieces of rhetoric . . . .”23  
Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed 
the commission’s decision.24 The court determined that Phillips’s free 
speech rights were not violated because baking is not expressive conduct 
protected by the First Amendment and that the commission’s order did 
not compel Phillips to convey a supportive message of same-sex 
marriage.25 The court also determined that Phillips’s free exercise rights 
were not violated because the anti-discrimination law is a law of general 
application that the commission applied neutrally.26 The Colorado 
Supreme Court denied review, but the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in 2017.27 
Around the same time of Phillips’s adjudication, the commission 
handled a somewhat similar case. William Jack, a devout Christian, 
sought to purchase a custom-made cake with anti-gay designs.28 Three 
Colorado bakeries denied Jack’s requests, and Jack filed a complaint with 
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission.29 The commission determined 
that the bakeries properly denied Jack’s requests since their denials were 
based not on Jack’s religion but on the cake designs’ anti-gay messages, 
which the commission deemed offensive.30 
  
                                                                                                                 
‘quarterly compliance reports’ . . . and . . . ‘describ[e] the remedial actions taken.’” (first alteration 
in original) (citations omitted)).     
 22. See id. at 1729.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 1726–27.   
 25. Id. at 1727. 
 26. Id. Justice Kennedy noted that the court of appeals did not mention the commission’s 
religion-related comments and that it instead, only in a footnote, compared the commission’s 
handling of William Jack’s and Phillips’s cases. Id. at 1730. 
 27. Id. at 1727.  
 28. Id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, provided more 
information about Jack’s cake designs. Id. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 1728–29 (majority opinion).  
 30. Id.   
4
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II.  THE FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE 
The First Amendment prescribes that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.31 Even with this broad 
constitutional protection, under certain circumstances the government 
can compel or punish conduct that an individual’s religion prohibits.32 
For example, the government can compel a food vendor to sell food to 
African Americans, despite the vendor’s religious objections.33 As 
established in Employment Division v. Smith,34 the government can 
compel or punish conduct, despite religious objections, if the government 
neutrally enforces a generally applicable law.35 For example, the 
government can enforce a generally applicable anti-drug-consumption 
law to prevent the ritual consumption of a psychedelic drug.36  
Under the Smith framework, neutral administration and enactment of 
law is a key aspect of the analysis.37 The government must treat each 
religious individual or group with respect and tolerance.38 Even “subtle 
                                                                                                                 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if 
the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct 
because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”).    
Academics dispute the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause. Some academics 
believe that the clause exempts religious objectors from neutral laws of general applicability. See, 
e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990) (“The conclusions of this analysis are (1) that 
exemptions were seen as a constitutionally permissible means for protecting religious freedom, 
(2) that constitutionally compelled exemptions were within the contemplation of the framers and 
ratifiers as a possible interpretation of the free exercise clause, and (3) that exemptions were 
consonant with the popular American understanding of the interrelation between the claims of a 
limited government and a sovereign God.”). Others believe that such exemptions were not 
originally understood. See, e.g., Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1085 
(2008) (concluding, after analyzing the drafting of the Second Amendment, that such exemptions 
were not originally understood).   
 32. E.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402–03 n.5 (1968).   
 33. Id. at 400, 402 n.5. 
 34. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).   
 35. Id. at 886 n.3. 
 36. See id. at 890.  
 37. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) 
(“In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First Amendment 
forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general.”). See 
also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 396–97 (1990) 
(“From the State’s point of view, the critical question is not whether the materials are religious, 
but whether there is a sale or a use, a question which only involves a secular determination.”). 
 38. See id. at 540; see also id. at 547 (“The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself 
to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem 
5
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departures from neutrality” evidence a lack of respect for and tolerance 
of religion, which violates the First Amendment.39 This determination is 
based on “the historical background of the decision under challenge, the 
specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in 
question, and the legislative or administrative history, including 
contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking 
body.”40 Additionally, the government cannot engage in “religious 
gerrymander[ing],” where the government creates rules or schemes that 
target or affect only religious individuals or entities.41   
To illustrate, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah,42 the Hialeah City Council passed an ordinance that prohibited 
animal sacrifice, a known ritual of the Santeria religion.43 During 
deliberations, city council members commented on the Santeria religion. 
One councilman questioned, “[I]f we could not practice this [religion] in 
our homeland [of Cuba], why bring it to this country?”44 Another stated 
that members of the Santeria religion “are in violation of everything this 
country stands for.”45 Another stated that he was “totally against the 
sacrificing of animals” because although the “Bible says we are allowed 
to sacrifice an animal for consumption[;] . . .  for any other purposes, I 
don’t believe that the Bible allows that.”46  
The Court determined that the city council enacted this ordinance to 
specifically target members of the Santeria religion.47 Using the Smith 
framework, the Court held that the ordinance was not a neutral law of 
general applicability.48 Speaking to neutrality, the Court determined that 
the ordinance was passed to suppress religion.49 The Court held:  
                                                                                                                 
from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their 
own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.”).    
 39. Id. at 534 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).  
 40. Id. at 540. In other words, courts must look to “direct and circumstantial evidence.” Id.  
 41. See id. at 535 (defining “religious gerrymander” as “an impermissible attempt to target 
petitioners and their religious practices” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring))); see also Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free 
Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 
863–67 (2001) (analyzing the religious gerrymander in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye).   
 42. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
 43. Id. at 527, 530.  
 44. Id. at 541 (alterations in original). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 545 (“We conclude, in sum, that each of Hialeah’s ordinances pursues the city’s 
governmental interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief.”). 
 48. Id. at 545–46. 
 49. Id.  
6
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The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria 
adherents and their religious practices; the ordinances by 
their own terms target this religious exercise; the texts of the 
ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe 
religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular 
killings; and the ordinances suppress much more religious 
conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate 
ends asserted in their defense. These ordinances are not 
neutral, and the court below committed clear error in failing 
to reach this conclusion.50 
Thus, according to the Court, the city council violated the religious 
rights of the members of the Santeria religion.51 
III.  THE MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP OPINIONS 
In a 7–2 decision, the United States Supreme Court, led by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, ruled that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
violated Phillips’s free exercise rights.52 Justice Kagan, joined by Justice 
Breyer, wrote a concurring opinion that stressed the narrowness of the 
majority’s opinion, and further argued that the commission could 
rightfully treat Jack’s and Phillips’s cases differently, and disagreed with 
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence.53 Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, 
concurred but elaborated on Phillips’s free exercise claims in light of 
Justice Kagan’s concurrence and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.54 Justice 
Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred but wrote separately to 
rebut the Colorado Court of Appeals’s free speech arguments.55 Justice 
Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented and argued that the 
commission properly enforced the state anti-discrimination law.56 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 542 (emphasis added).  
 51. Id. at 547. The Court also analyzed the general applicability of the ordinance. Id. at 
542–46.  
 52. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).  
 53. Id. at 1732–34 (Kagan, J., concurring).  
 54. Id. at 1734–40 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
 55. Id. at 1740–48 (Thomas, J., concurring). Here is Justice Thomas’s argument: For 
conduct to be expressive, thus warranting First Amendment free speech protections, (1) the actor 
must subjectively intend to convey a message through conduct and (2) the audience must 
objectively understand the communicative nature of the conduct. Id. at 1741. Justice Thomas 
argued that Phillips, by baking wedding cakes, subjectively believed that a wedding cake 
“communicates that ‘a wedding has occurred, a marriage has begun, and the couple should be 
celebrated.’” Id. at 1743. The audience understands that “[w]edding cakes do, in fact, 
communicate this message.” Id. (analyzing the history of wedding cakes). Therefore, Justice 
Thomas would have ruled differently than the court of appeals. 
 56. Id. at 1748–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
7
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IV.  THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Surprisingly, the Court decided the case on free exercise, not free 
speech, grounds.57 Using the Free Exercise Clause’s doctrinal 
framework, Justice Kennedy analyzed whether the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission neutrally enforced a generally applicable law.58 He 
determined that it did not.59 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy 
focused on the commissioners’ statements regarding religion that were 
made during Phillips’s adjudication as well as the commission’s disparate 
treatment of Jack’s and Phillips’s cases.60 
Justice Kennedy described the commission’s statements as “clear[ly] 
and impermissibl[y] hostil[e] toward” Phillips’s religious beliefs.61 For 
example, one commissioner stated that Phillips should compromise his 
religious beliefs to conduct business in the state.62 Another commissioner 
attributed atrocities such as slavery and the Holocaust to religion,  calling 
religion “despicable” rhetoric when it is used to justify discrimination.63 
Though Justice Kennedy ultimately determined that the former statement 
was open to different interpretations,64 he described the latter statement 
as clear evidence of the commission’s nonneutrality and hostility toward 
Phillips’s religious beliefs.65  
Justice Kennedy also analyzed the commission’s treatment of William 
Jack, the Christian consumer who sought cakes with anti-gay messages.66 
The commission deemed Jack’s cake designs offensive but praised the 
bakeries’ willingness to bake religiously themed cakes without the anti-
gay messages.67 The commission determined that the bakeries properly 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Justice Kennedy briefly touched on the free speech issues. He sympathized with the 
“artistic” Phillips’s free speech beliefs, finding “it difficult to find a line where the customers’ 
rights to goods and services became a demand for [Phillips] to exercise the right of his own 
personal expression for [Craig and Mullins’s] message, a message he could not express in a way 
consistent with his religious beliefs.” Id. at 1728 (majority opinion). But he noted that this issue 
“must await further elaboration in the courts.” Id. at 1732.   
 58. Id. at 1731–32.  
 59. Id. at 1732.  
 60. Id. at 1729–31. 
 61. Id. at 1729.  
 62. See id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. “On the one hand,” the statements could mean that businesses cannot discriminate based 
on sexual orientation “regardless of the proprietor’s personal views.” Id. “On the other hand,” the 
statements could be dismissive comments about Phillips’s religious beliefs. Id. “[T]he latter seems 
more likely.” Id.   
 65. Id. (“This sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn 
responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law—a law 
protects against discrimination on the basis of religion as well as orientation.”).  
 66. Id. at 1730–31. 
 67. Id.  
8
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denied Jack’s requests because their “conscience-based objections [were] 
legitimate.”68 With Phillips, Justice Kennedy noted that the commission 
seemingly approved of Craig and Mullins’s wedding cake message but 
did not consider Phillips’s willingness to bake other cakes, cookies, and 
brownies for the couple as it did in the case of Jack.69 The commission 
determined that Phillips improperly denied Craig and Mullins’s request 
because his conscience-based concerns were illegitimate.70 Justice 
Kennedy concluded that, in doing so, the commission protected beliefs 
that it agreed with and impermissibly punished beliefs that it disagreed 
with.71  
Because the commission expressed anti-religious sentiments during 
Phillips’s case, and because the commission unequally applied the anti-
discrimination law between Jack’s and Phillips’s cases, the majority held 
that the commission did not act in a neutral manner, which violated 
Phillips’s free exercise rights.72  
V.  THE KAGAN CONCURRENCE 
Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred with the majority 
opinion.73 Justice Kagan agreed that the commission did not act neutrally 
during Phillips’s adjudication,74 but asserted that Jack’s and Phillips’s 
cases were distinguishable.75 Justice Kagan argued that the bakeries in 
Jack’s case acted properly because they “did not single out Jack because 
of his religion.”76 The bakeries denied Jack’s cake requests because they 
disagreed with the cake designs’ anti-gay message—a message the 
bakeries would not have conveyed, regardless of customer.77 Justice 
Kagan contended that Phillips, in contrast, singled out Craig and Mullins 
because of their sexual orientation.78 While Phillips may have disagreed 
with same-sex marriage and the message that baking a wedding cake for 
a same-sex marriage could have conveyed, he would have baked the cake 
had the couple been opposite-sex.79 Therefore, Phillips denied the couple 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. at 1730.  
 69. Id.  
 70. See id.  
 71. Id. at 1731 (“A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these two instances 
cannot be based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness.”).  
 72. Id. at 1732.  
 73. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring).  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1732–33 (describing the differences as “obvious”). 
 76. Id. at 1733. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. Justice Gorsuch disagreed. See id. at 1736 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“In both cases, 
it was the kind of cake, not the kind of customer, that mattered to the bakers.”). Justice Kagan 
9
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his service because of their sexual orientation and not the message that 
the wedding cake would have conveyed.80 In Justice Kagan’s opinion, 
this constituted unlawful discrimination under the state’s anti-
discrimination law.81  
VI.  THE GORSUCH CONCURRENCE  
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, agreed with the majority’s 
central arguments: The commission acted biasedly against Phillips’s 
religion, and the commission treated Jack’s and Phillips’s cases 
disparately, all amounting to a violation of Phillips’s free exercise 
rights.82 The concurrence purported to take aim at Justice Kagan’s 
concurrence and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.83  
Generally, the more liberal Justices agreed that Jack’s and Phillips’s 
cases were distinguishable. Justice Kagan admitted that the commission 
could have, but failed to, articulate a proper reason for this different 
treatment,84 while Justice Ginsburg wholly denied that the commission 
acted impermissibly at all.85  
Justice Gorsuch highlighted that, in Jack’s and Phillips’s cases, the 
decisions were based on the “kind of cake, not the kind of customer.”86 
In Jack’s case, it was a cake with anti-gay messages.87 For Phillips, it was 
a cake that endorsed same-sex marriage.88 In Jack’s case, the bakeries 
would have not have baked a cake with the anti-gay messages, regardless 
of the protected classification of the prospective customer.89 For Phillips, 
he would not have baked a cake for a same-sex wedding, regardless of 
the protected classification of the prospective customers.90 While the 
bakeries in the two cases knew that they were denying service to 
customers with a protected classification, the bakeries did not 
intentionally deny service because of the customers’ protected 
                                                                                                                 
reinforced her arguments in a footnote that was directed to Justice Gorsuch. Id. at 1733 n.* 
(Kagan, J., concurring). 
 80. Id. at 1733–34.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring).  
 85. Id. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I see no reason why the comments of one or two 
Commissioners should be taken to overcome Phillips’[s] refusal to sell a wedding cake to Craig 
and Mullins.”).  
 86. Id. at 1736 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 87. Id. at 1735. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
10
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classifications.91 The distinction between knowingly denying service and 
intentionally denying service was a material aspect of Justice Gorsuch’s 
argument.92 
Justice Gorsuch then commented on the commission’s disparate 
treatment of Jack and Phillips, particularly in applying different legal 
standards to the two cases.93 In Jack’s case, the commission noted the 
difference between intentionally and knowingly denying service to a 
customer.94 Because the bakeries knowingly denied service to Jack but 
did not intentionally do so because of his protected classification, the 
commission held that the bakeries acted permissibly.95 But in Phillips’s 
case, the commission held that denying service to a customer with a 
protected classification created a presumption of intentional 
discrimination.96 Though Phillips knowingly denied service to Craig and 
Mullins but did not intentionally do so because of their classification, 
Phillips presumably discriminated based on a protected classification.97 
Justice Gorsuch noted that the commission was trying to “have it both 
ways.”98 “Either actual proof of intent to discriminate . . . is required . . . or 
it is sufficient to ‘presume’ such intent” from knowingly denying service 
to someone in a protected classification.99 Such “slid[ing] up and down 
the mens rea scale,” Justice Gorsuch concluded, would not do.100  
VII.  THE GINSBURG DISSENT 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued that Jack’s and 
Phillips’s cases were distinguishable and the comments made by the 
commission did not violate Phillips’s free exercise rights.101 Justice 
Ginsburg parroted the arguments made in Justice Kagan’s concurrence: 
The three bakeries in Jack’s case properly denied his anti-gay cake 
requests because the bakeries disagreed with his message—a message 
they would not convey, regardless of the protected classification of the 
prospective customer—while Phillips improperly denied Craig and 
Mullins’s request because of their sexual orientation.102  
Justice Ginsburg noted that Phillips’s offer to sell other baked goods 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. at 1735–36. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1736. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1737. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 1748–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 102. Id. at 1750.  
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to Craig and Mullins was “irrelevant” because Phillips makes wedding 
cakes for opposite-sex couples but not same-sex couples.103 The three 
bakeries’ offering to sell Jack a cake with religious symbolism other than 
an anti-gay-marriage message was relevant because the bakeries offer 
religious cakes to Christian and non-Christian consumers alike.104  
Justice Ginsburg also understated the commissioners’ anti-religious 
statements. The Justice saw “no reason why the comments of one or two 
Commissioners should be taken to overcome Phillips’[s] refusal to sell a 
wedding cake to Craig and Mullins.”105 She noted that Phillips’s case 
snaked through the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and was also 
evaluated by the Colorado Court of Appeals after the commission’s 
decision.106 Each decision-making body ruled against Phillips.107 She 
faulted the majority for not identifying where prejudice manifested itself 
in the decision-making process.108 She also differentiated between the 
case at issue and the Court’s free exercise precedent.109 Taken in total, 
Justice Ginsburg would have ruled in favor of Craig and Mullins.110  
VIII.  ANALYSIS 
To begin broadly, the Supreme Court, somewhat startlingly, ruled 
solely on the free exercise arguments, as opposed to the free speech 
arguments.111 Perhaps there is some virtue to this decision. For one, the 
free speech arguments are definitely the less clear-cut of the two 
arguments,112 and the commission clearly violated Phillips’s free exercise 
rights by acting in a nonneutral manner. Granted, the case was teed up as 
a free speech case—even the Solicitor General’s brief only addressed the 
free speech arguments.113 The free exercise ruling leaves one a bit 
wanting. But still, this case was—and is—controversial. Thus, by solely 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 1751.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 1751–52. 
 110. Id. at 1752. 
 111. Id. at 1732 (majority opinion). 
 112. Even Justice Kennedy admitted this. He sympathized with the “artistic” Phillips’s free 
speech beliefs, finding it “difficult to find a line where the customers’ rights to goods and services 
became a demand for [Phillips] to exercise the right of his own personal expression for [Craig and 
Mullins’s] message, a message he could not express in a way consistent with his religious beliefs.” 
Id. at 1728.  
 113. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at III, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (arguing, solely, that the “First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause bars the application of Colorado’s public accommodations law to petitioners in 
this case”). 
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addressing the less controversial constitutional issue, the Court avoided a 
sharper public reaction and afforded more time for the free speech issues 
to percolate. 
Turning to the free exercise arguments, the Court determined that the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not enforce the state’s anti-
discrimination law neutrally, and this lack of neutrality was evidenced by 
the commission’s statements on religion and the commission’s disparate 
treatment of the Jack and Phillips cases.114  
This analysis stayed true to the Court’s precedent. The Court stayed 
within its Smith free exercise framework and provided another example 
where the government applied a law nonneutrally. Specifically, the Court 
looked to “the historical background of the decision under challenge, the 
specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in 
question, and the legislative or administrative history, including 
contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking 
body.”115 In this case, the Court looked to the “specific series of events” 
of the commission’s adjudication of Jack’s and Phillips’s cases.116 It 
looked to the “contemporaneous statements made by members” of the 
commission.117 The Court then determined that the commission engaged 
in a religious gerrymander, where the government applied different rules 
and standards to religious and non-religious actors.118 Taken in total, the 
Court determined that the commission did not act neutrally and thus 
violated Phillips’s free exercise rights.119 
While seven of the nine Justices agreed with this result,120 Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor did not. The dissent instead argued that the 
commissioners’ statements regarding Phillips’s religion were irrelevant, 
that anti-religious prejudice could not be found in the decision-making 
process, and that the majority did not adhere to its free exercise 
precedent.121 In doing so, the dissent risks complicating the Free Exercise 
Clause analysis by adding exceptions and qualifications to the doctrine. 
Ultimately, the dissent’s arguments missed the mark, and each argument 
is next discussed in turn. 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.  
 115. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 532, 540 (1993). In 
other words, courts must look to “direct and circumstantial evidence.” Id. 
 116. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–30, 1731.  
 117. Id.  
 118. See id. at 1732; id. at 1739 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
 119. Id. at 1731 (majority opinion) (“For the reasons just described, the Commission’s 
treatment of Phillips’[s] case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws 
or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.”).  
 120. Id. at 1722. Granted, Justices Breyer and Kagan believed that the Jack and Phillips cases 
were distinguishable from one another. Id. at 1732–33 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 121. Id. at 1751–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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First, the dissent simply tossed the commission’s comments on 
religion aside. The dissent saw “no reason why the comments of one or 
two Commissioners should be taken to overcome Phillips’[s] refusal to 
sell a wedding cake to Craig and Mullins.”122 However, when analyzing 
free exercise claims, courts must look to “contemporaneous statements 
made by members of the decisionmaking body.”123 And the statements 
made by some commissioners were plainly biased against Phillips’s 
religion. One commissioner commented that religious beliefs should be 
compromised to conduct business in Colorado.124 Another attributed 
mass atrocities to religion.125 Like the comments made by the Hialeah 
City Council in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,126 these statements 
evidenced a bias against religion. These statements showed intolerance 
for Phillips’s religion, and tolerance, according to the Court, is crucial to 
an individual’s free exercise rights.127  
True, only a few commissioners made these statements. But as the 
dissent noted,128 even if “one or two” commissioners made these 
statements, as opposed to four or five, these statements, at best, evidence 
that “one or two” commissioners did not neutrally enforce the anti-
discrimination law. At worst, they evidence that anti-religious sentiment 
festered in the commission’s adjudication. Either way, a governmental 
body and governmental actors showed intolerance for an individual’s 
religion.129 The Court majority suggests that every governmental actor, 
at every step of the adjudicatory process, must show tolerance and respect 
for religion. This ensures governmental respect and toleration of religious 
values and, in turn, protects religious liberty.  
The dissent focused too heavily on the actions of the lower levels of 
the commission and the appellate review of the court of appeals. True, 
the record does not evidence that these decision-making bodies showed 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. at 1750.  
 123. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 532, 540 (1993).  
 124. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.  
 125. Id.  
 126. 508 U.S. at 541.  
 127. Id. at 532 (“Indeed, it was ‘historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance 
that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.’” (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 
U.S. 693, 703 (1986))).  
 128. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 129. See generally Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975) (“[A] ‘fair trial in a fair 
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’ . . . Not only is a biased decisionmaker 
constitutionally unacceptable but ‘our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the 
probability of unfairness.’ In pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which 
experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is 
too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” (citation omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 
133, 136 (1955))). 
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bias or animosity toward Phillips.130 But the commission did. The 
commission was intolerant of Phillips’s beliefs, regardless of the court of 
appeals’s or the lower levels of the commission’s actions. The 
commission itself caused harm to Phillips’s religious rights, and as such, 
the inquiry should center on the commission. Appellate courts and lower 
adjudicatory bodies cannot and should not wash away constitutional 
violations of governmental bodies.  
This intolerance and nonneutrality are evidenced not only by the 
commission’s contemporaneous statements but also by the specific series 
of events in its adjudication of Jack’s and Phillips’s cases. Justice 
Gorsuch’s concurrence got this argument right: The commission departed 
from neutrality via a religious gerrymander.131 The commission 
differentiated between knowing and intentional discrimination in Jack’s 
case but applied a presumption of discrimination in Phillips’s case.132 The 
commission determined that the bakeries in Jack’s case acted properly in 
denying his requests while Phillips acted impermissibly.133 This disparate 
treatment—evidenced by the commission’s different set of rules for each 
case—coupled with the commission’s religious statements shows 
nonneutral enforcement of the anti-discrimination law.   
The dissent also noted that the majority’s opinion is “far removed” 
from the Court’s opinion in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye.134 The dissent 
argued that in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, one single decision-making 
body—the Hialeah City Council—acted and violated a religious group’s 
rights.135 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Phillips’s case was heard by and 
adjudicated in numerous decision-making bodies.136 The dissent argued 
that prejudice was clearly found in the single decision-making body in 
the former case and that prejudice could not be found in the numerous 
decision-making bodies in the latter case.137  
However, the dissent’s interpretation of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye 
is far removed from that case’s holding. In that case, the Court held that 
“subtle departures from neutrality” violate the First Amendment since the 
Constitution “commits the government itself to religious tolerance, and 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725–26. 
 131. Id. at 1739 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
 132. Id. at 1735–36. 
 133. Id. at 1736. 
 134. Id. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 135. Id. at 1751–52 (“What prejudice infected the determinations of the adjudicators in the 
case before and after the Commission? The Court does not say. Phillips’[s] case is thus far 
removed from the only precedent upon which the Court relies, where the government action 
that violated a principle of religious neutrality implicated a sole decisionmaking body, the city 
council.” (citation omitted)).  
 136. Id. at 1751. 
 137. Id. at 1751–52. 
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upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from 
animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause 
to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it 
secures.”138 The Hialeah City Council’s actions and statements evidenced 
a lack of neutrality. In this case, the commission, via its comments about 
religion and its treatment of Jack’s and Phillips’s cases, evidenced 
intolerance for Phillips’s religious beliefs, thus violating Phillips’s 
constitutional rights.  
True, the governmental entity in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye was a 
city council, and the governmental entity in Masterpiece Cakeshop was 
an adjudicatory state administrative agency. But the nonneutrality and 
biased decision-making of an adjudicatory governmental entity should 
cause more concern than a legislative entity. After all, in adjudications, 
liberty interests are often at stake,139 and due process is premised on 
impartial decision-making.140  
Taken in total, the majority and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence 
persuasively analyzed the free exercise arguments in the case and adhered 
to the Court’s precedent. The same, however, cannot be said of the 
dissent.  
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop was an 
unexpected one. The case was widely billed as a free speech case but was 
resolved on free exercise grounds. Many thought that the case would 
come down on ideological lines, but a 7–2 majority ruled the day. Despite 
the seven-person majority, each Justice would have resolved the case 
slightly differently. Still, the Masterpiece Cakeshop case does provide 
some answers. The Court’s decision affirmed the Court’s Smith free 
exercise framework, provided another example of nonneutral 
governmental action, and reinforced an important tenet of the Free 
Exercise Clause—the government must respect and tolerate religion. 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 547 (1993) 
(quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).  
 139. See generally Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (“[T]he 
court has required due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal 
constraints imposed by the criminal process.”). 
 140. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975) (“[A] ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process.’ . . . Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally 
unacceptable but ‘our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of 
unfairness.’ In pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which experience 
teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to 
be constitutionally tolerable.” (citation omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955))). But see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 557–59 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(questioning the extent to which comments made during the legislative decision-making process 
should be considered in this analysis).  
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